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United States District Court,
District of Rhode Island.

UNITED STATES of America v.
Dagoberto LUNA1
No. 03-111ML
Argued and Decided January 19,2005
Government's Motion for Reconsideration and Correction of
Sentence

19 JANUARY 2005 - 9:30 A.M.
THE COURT: This is the matter of the United States versus
Dagoberto Luna. The matter is before the Court this morning on
the Government's motion for reconsideration and correction of
sentence.
Mr. Luna, so you'll understand, I know you were here last
week and I imposed a sentence that I thought was an appropriate
sentence. However, the Government has since filed a motion
pointing out that the Court does not have the authority to impose
a suspended sentence, which was part of the disposition I made in
your case last week; and in an effort to correct that sentence, I
scheduled the matter today for hearing.
So I am vacating the sentence imposed last week on the basis
of the Government's motion indicating that the sentence I did
impose, at least that portion that suspended a term of
imprisonment, is not permissible under the current statutory
scheme.
1. Reconsideration and Correction of Sentence Hearing Transcript,
United States v. Luna, No. 03-111ML (D.R.I. 2005) (Judge Mary Lisi
presiding).
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THE COURT: Okay. Let's, then, start anew. This Defendant
stands convicted by virtue of his admission of illegally reentering
the United States after having been deported.
The probation officer in this case prepared a comprehensive
pre-sentence investigation report which chronicles not only this
Defendant's personal history but also a rather remarkable history
of prior criminal offenses.
At the time that the pre-sentence investigation report was
prepared, the Supreme Court had not ruled in the Booker and
Fanfan cases. Accordingly, the probation officer under the
prevailing law made a guidelines determination that this
Defendant has a criminal history category of VI with a total
offense level of 22, which provides for a guideline range of 84 to
105 months of incarceration.
As I read the Booker decision, primarily Justice Breyer's
majority opinion, the guidelines themselves are no longer
mandatory and controlling on the Court's sentencing authority.
Rather, the guidelines have become advisory and are one item
that the Court must consider in fashioning an individualized
sentence.
The other change in the law that Booker works is that the
standard on appeal is one of reasonableness, and so this Court's
sentence will be measured on a reasonableness test rather than
whether or not I have properly applied mechanically and
mathematically the prior system that was in place.
THE COURT: Okay. So let me hear from you, Mr. Lockhart
[for the Government], on sentence.
MR. LOCKHART: Your Honor, as we pointed out in the
memorandum in aid of sentencing, we believe, along with Judge
Cassell of Utah,2 that in order to meaningfully consult the
guideline sentencing range as Booker requires and as the
Sentencing Reform Act requires, it is, first of all, necessary to
have a pre-sentence report prepared; and that's been done in this
case.
In other words, without a GSR or guideline sentencing range,
2. See United States v. Wilson, 350 F.Supp.2d 910, 911-25 (D. Utah
2005).
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the Court has no benchmark to make a decision on whether it
should follow the GSR, guideline sentencing range, or not.
So the PSR was prepared in this case. There were no - there
was at one time an objection to the criminal history score
calculation. That objection was withdrawn at the sentencing
hearing, and so there is no dispute now that the total offense level
is 22, criminal history category is VI.
So I think, along with Judge Cassell, you have to start from
the premise that that guideline sentencing range is something
that you should place, what Judge Cassell says, considerable
weight on in arriving THE COURT: And, of course, Judge Cassell has no
precedential affect here.
MR. LOCKHART: He doesn't.
THE COURT: Last I checked, he's a district judge out in
Utah.
MR. LOCKHART: Correct, but we think that his opinion
forecasts the likely First Circuit result in some fashion or another.
We also think that it's a fair reading of the Booker opinion itself
and the Sentencing Reform Act as well.
Remember that the Sentencing Reform Act, a provision which
is still valid of that Act, says in 3553(a)(4), I believe, that the
Court has to consult THE COURT: Well Booker doesn't say that we have to give
heavy reliance on the guidelines. As I read the majority opinion,
that is, the Breyer majority opinion, he says that the Federal
Sentencing Act makes the guidelines effectively advisory. It
requires a sentencing Court to consider guideline ranges, but it
permits the Court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory
concerns as well with a reference to Section 3553(a).
MR. LOCKHART: Yes, but as Judge Cassell points out, the
fact that you're required to consult the guidelines leaves open the
question of what weight the Court should place on the guidelines.
We would agree that Booker doesn't directly address the
question of what weight the Court is to place on the guidelines. I
don't think it implicitly says the Court doesn't have to place much
weight or that the Court has to place great weight. It leaves the
question open.
And so the wisdom of Judge Cassell's decision, we think, is
that he looked into the question of what weight was appropriate
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and decided that it made sense to place considerable weight on the
guideline range for a couple of reasons. First of all, the statutory
factors -

THE COURT: What exactly does that mean, though, Mr.
Lockhart?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, what it means is that the Court
should begin from the presumption that the guideline sentencing
range calculated by the pre-sentence report should be the
appropriate range unless there is some unusual or exceptional
feature in the case. That is the way we read it.
In other words, the Court should take that as the starting
point and then decide whether, in light of the other statutory
factors set forth in 3553, the Court should deviate from what or
whether, for example, there's a basis for a downward departure or,
conversely, an upward departure under the guidelines.
THE COURT: Are we really talking in terms of departures,
though, and this is an issue I think Booker doesn't address, and
that is the whole section of the guidelines on departures, when the
Court says that the guidelines are no longer mandatory but rather
advisory?
I'm not so sure that we're really stuck with a departure mode
if the Court decides, for instance, in this case to sentence outside
that guideline range.
MR. LOCKHART: Well, our view of it is that in order to
meaningfully consult the guidelines, you have to go through the
full range of guideline analyses, including any upward or
downward departure requests made by the parties.
Now, after you determine what the guideline sentencing
range is, we agree that, obviously, the Court still has flexibility
because the guidelines are now advisory to impose a different
sentence; but what is clear from the Booker decision is that the
probation department is still supposed to prepare pre-sentence
reports, the parties are still supposed to go through the process of
objecting to that, and it makes sense that, consequently, the
parties should also be in a position to brief the question of
downward or upward departures.
I think it's only after the Court resolves sentencing objections
and departure requests that the Court then needs to look at the
question of is it going to deviate from the final guideline
sentencing range. It's only through arriving at that final range -

2006]

UNITED STATES OFAMERICAN V. LUNA

593

THE COURT: Let me ask you this, Mr. Lockhart. I've read
the decision out of Utah, and I'm not sure how one reconciles that
approach with the standard of review that the Court announced in
Booker.
The standard now is one of reasonableness. It's not whether
or not the Court gave or relied heavily on the guidelines provision
or even that the guidelines provision is to be considered a
presumptively reasonable sentence.
So how do you reconcile the Court's pronouncement that the
standard of review on appeal of the sentence, one the Court has
applied 3553(a), and a portion of that obviously is a look at the
guidelines themselves, how do you reconcile that?
I mean, granted, it would be very easy for this Court to simply
say, as I think the Court in Utah seemed to be saying, Well, what
Booker really means is the guidelines aren't mandatory anymore,
but the right way to do it is the apply guidelines. I'm not so sure
that's what Booker requires.
MR. LOCKHART: Well, the way to reconcile it is this way,
your Honor. First of all, we disagree with the position that the
reasonableness standard is the primary light by which this Court
must be guided. It's the standard of review on appeal. Booker
makes clear you have to consult the guidelines. The only way to
do that is to actually find out what the guideline sentencing range
is and then explain why you're not following it in a given case.
Remember, there is the Feeney Amendment which requires an
explanation -

THE COURT: Oh, I remember the Feeney Amendment.
MR. LOCKHART: - an explanation for deviating from the
GSR. That provision was left on the books, it wasn't really
affected by Booker, and so what that suggests is that the Court
has to sort of start with the presumption that the guideline
sentencing range is an appropriate starting point and then work
from there and explain why it's deviating from that range.
Now, on appeal, the Court of Appeals will apply a
reasonableness standard, but I'm quite confident that it will be
fleshed out when the First Circuit and other circuits get is so that
there will be more to it than just a sort of I-like-it-when-I-see-it
kind of reasonable standard on appeal. I assume, along with - I
think Justice Scalia may have made this point in his dissent, that
the Courts will enact more of an analytical standard than that on
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appeal and that what we'll be left with is a rule which says that a
sentence within the guideline sentencing range is presumptively
reasonable absent some extraordinary circumstances; a sentence
that's outside the guideline sentencing range, while it might not
be presumptively unreasonable, is going to be deserving of further
scrutiny by the Court of Appeals.
They will take a closer look at that sentence, and they will
expect, consistent with the Feeney Amendment, an explanation
from the Court on how it arrived at that sentence.
Now, I think, practically speaking, the Government is not
going to take every single one of these cases up before the First
Circuit on an unreasonableness theory. It will have to pick and
choose of necessity, and so what I expect is you will begin to see
before the First Circuit cases where there's just such a yawning
gap between the guideline sentencing range and the sentence
imposed that the Government appeals or a failure on the part of a
judge to show that it's considered the guideline sentencing range
and the statutory criteria.
So that is the way I expect it will play out in the Court of
Appeals, and that's how I think you can reconcile the
reasonableness standard with my position.
Now, having said that, there was no objection to the PSR.
The GSR was correctly calculated. The low end of that is seven
years. Our plea agreement commits us to making that
recommendation, and we stand by it. And I think, as the Court
pointed out, this Defendant has a very significant record, criminal
record in this case, plus the fact that he's come back now twice to
this country showing that he's not willing to abide by our
immigration laws.
THE COURT: I think, so that you'll know, Mr. Lockhart, I
believe that the Government conceded that the first deportation of
Mr. Luna was procedurally defective; and so that was not the
basis for the charge in this case.
I'm not so sure what happened in that one; but for purposes of
sentencing, I'm really not going to take that one into account.
MR. LOCKHART: Okay. So in any event, we stick with our
original recommendation of seven years. Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Roy [for the Defendant].
MR. ROY: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, in terms of
analyzing what the Court has to do, I agree with the Government
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that the PSR certainly has a lot of value. A lot of time has gone
into implementing the guidelines, and a lot of work goes in by
probation in terms of putting a report together.
So I think that the reports are still very, very valuable; but I
think in terms of where Booker leaves us right now, I think that
you have to look at the provision of 18 U.S. Code, Section 3553,
that states that the Court shall impose a sentence that is
sufficient, but not more than necessary, to punish the Defendant.
There are a litany of different things the Court has to
consider, but I think that the Government's position, and the way
that Mr. Lockhart would have the Court analyze this, I think
would really nullify the Booker decision.
If the Court still has to abide by the guidelines and has to
perform a departure analysis to go below the guidelines, then
really Booker means nothing; and that's consistent with what the
Government, I think, has done after Blakely. For every case I
had, they said despite some clarity in the Blakely opinion, Blakely
doesn't apply to the guidelines. And now that the first part of
Booker says it does, well, if it does apply, it doesn't really apply.
We still win no matter what. And I think that that's not how I
read Booker, you Honor.
So I'm asking the Court to impose the same sentence that it
imposed, four years to serve, 48 months. That is still a very
substantial sentence for this nonviolent crime.
In terms of analyzing whether or not the guideline, the overall
guideline is reasonable, one of the things I thought about when I
was looking at the Government's memo, your Honor, is, we started
off with Mr. Luna with a 16-level increase for an aggravated
felony. He went from 8 to 24.
Parenthetically, Level 24 is the same level the Defendant
would be at if he had one prior drug felony, possessed a firearm in
connection with another drug dealing offense. That's how huge
the 16-level increase is.
And also parenthetically, and I know the Court sees these
cases, if Mr. Luna had a firearm and had two prior violent
felonies, that would make him a Level 24, two prior drug felonies.
So that's the extent of the increase that the guidelines
provided for essentially a nonviolent crime. So I think that to put
someone in jail for seven years for a nonviolent crime certainly
costs the taxpayers of the United States a great deal of money,
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and I think that seven years is more than is necessary for the
Court to comply with what Section 3553 requires.
THE COURT: Mr. Roy, I'd like you to address another
consideration, and that is the terms of his incarceration as one
who will eventually be surrendered for deportation.
MR. ROY: One thing, you Honor, and I received a memo
actually from another inmate at Wyatt yesterday, and I intended
to address this, that is inmates that are facing deportation like
Mr. Luna have restricted privileges within the Bureau of Prisons.
They are not eligible for, for instance, the 400-hour drug
program. They're not eligible for boot camp, for all intents and
purposes. And the reason, your Honor, is, the presence of an
immigration detainee is a higher security factor, if you will, and
I'm certain appropriately; but their incarceration, your Honor, is
different than the incarceration of inmates that are - that do not
have immigration holds like Mr. Luna.
MR. ROY: And for those reasons, your Honor, I ask the Court
to respectfully impose the 48-month sentence that was imposed
last Friday. I think it's reasonable under all the circumstances.
Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Lockhart, did you want to respond at all?
MR. LOCKHART: Just briefly, your Honor, on that last point
first. I believe the First Circuit has held, obviously pre-Booker,
that the different conditions under which deportable prisoners are
incarcerated is not a basis for a downward departure.
THE COURT: A downward departure.
MR. LOCKHART: Right. So I think we should - again, in
light of my overall philosophy articulated to the Court, you have to
begin from that premise.
Now, we also don't see that factor anywhere in the statutory
criteria either of the - I think it's the eight or so factors set forth THE COURT: Well, doesn't 3553(a)(2)(D) talk about the need
for the sentence imposed to provide the Defendant with
educational or vocational training, medical care or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner?
So shouldn't I look at exactly what terms and conditions of
confinement Mr. Luna will be facing versus someone who, as Mr.
Roy pointed out, is a Level 24 here on a drug and gun charge?
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MR. LOCKHART: No, because the remedy that you'd be
giving him a more lenient sentence wouldn't provide him with any
sort of available educational programs.
In other words, there's a disconnect to our mind between the
goal of the Court in providing him with more of the services and
the remedy imposed. Lessening his prison term isn't going to give
him access to more programs within the prison.
THE COURT: Well, don't I have to read that provision,
though, in concert with 3553(a), that is that I should impose a
sentence that's sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply
with the purposes set forth in Section (2)?
MR. LOCKHART: The answer to that is, you're referring to
what the Courts have called the parsimony principle, and Judge
Cassell talks about that in his opinion; and Judge Cassell's point,
which is our point, is that the Sentencing Commission has taken
into account the parsimony principle as well as the other factors in
3553 in arriving at the guideline sentencing range, and this is why
it's so important to begin from the premise that that range should
control absent an exceptional case.
So, in other words, the Sentencing Commission, which has
access to data on reentry offenders and which took into account
deterrent issues, the parsimony principle, rehabilitative issues
and so forth, said that a sentence of low end, seven years in this
case, was appropriate.
And so, again, there would have to be something very
uniquely - very unique, rather, to justify a major difference in the
sentence based on perhaps some added parsimony that the Court
might wasn't to dole out in addition to what the Sentencing
Commission has already provided.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. LOCKHART: And just for the sake of the record, to the
extent the Court disagrees with Judge Cassell on the weight to be
given the guidelines and thinks that the guidelines are just on
factor to be considered and that they're not deserving of
considerable or great weight, we'd ask the Court just to clarify for
the record what its view is on that question because it seems to me
that is the threshold legal question; and because the Court hasn't
yet imposed a sentence, we don't know yet whether it's going got
be one that we agree with on a reasonableness scale.
THE COURT: Mr. Lockhart, I thank you for coming today
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because this issue is one that all of us involved in the system will
struggle with over the next several months and maybe years.
The Supreme Court's decision was on that I think no one
really anticipated. I think all of us were wagering that perhaps it
would be A or B. Instead we got C. And all of us are still, I think,
digesting it; and what you will see will be a number of trial judges
like myself struggling with what does it mean, what are the rules
now.
We have been freed of the binds of the guidelines, and in
many respects that makes the job of the sentencing judge all the
harder because the sentencing judge now must look at a number
of variables, including the guidelines.
I'm not discounting their validity in terms of their now
advisory nature; but I think, as you said, we will not know
precisely how we should proceed on these matters until the Court
of Appeals, and perhaps even the Supreme Court again, has an
opportunity to decide some of these cases.
THE COURT: The Court in this case has the pre-sentence
report which, as I said at the beginning o this hearing, sets forth
this Defendant's rather substantial criminal history. He has a
record of convictions going back to his teen years. He has been
sentenced to prison for many of those offenses.
The pre-sentence report also sets forth this Defendant's
personal history. He says, and I have no reason to disbelieve him,
that he was brought to this country as an infant; and, in fact, he
entered the country as a legal permanent resident, according to
the pre-sentence report.
He was deported to the Dominican Republic where he has no
family, doesn't speak the language and has absolutely no support
system. He is, for all intents and purposes, an American. He's
lived in this country his entire life with the exception of the short
period of time shortly after his deportation.
The guidelines in this case, based on his criminal history and
on that 16-level increase required by virtue of the fact of his prior
conviction for an aggravated felony, in this case I think it was an
assault, put the Defendant in a range of seven years, that is 84
months, to 105 months.
It's a very long sentence even at the low end; and if I were
sentencing the Defendant prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
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Booker, I would have been required by the law to impose at least
the 84 months of incarceration.
Under Booker, however, the trial Court is granted some
discretion in sentencing. As Justice Breyer wrote under the
majority's opinion on remedy, "The sentencing Court is required to
consider the guideline ranges, but it permits the Court to tailor
the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well," and the
Court directs us to the statute entitled "Imposition of Sentence."
Now, 3553, that is Section 3553 of Title 18, sets forth several
factors that a Court must consider in fashioning a sentence in a
particular case, that is, with respect to a particular Defendant.
Unlike the law pre-Booker where the Court was really
constrained by the mandatory nature of the guidelines, in the
post-Booker era, trial judges must still adhere to the law as
Congress has given it to us in Section 3553, but trial judges are
also free to utilize judgment and have the ability, as Justice
Breyer said, to tailor a sentence, an individualized sentence, that
takes into account all the pluses and minuses in that particular
Defendant's case.
I start with the statute itself. "The court shall impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with
the purposes set forth in paragraph (2)."
I must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the Defendant. Well, in this
case I have essentially a nonviolent felony. On the other had, I
have a Defendant who has been no angel. He's committed several
offenses for which he has been sentenced to various terms of
imprisonment and probation.
And looking at his individualized characteristics, I see
someone who has been in this country since infancy and who
originally came here legally, and what I don't know is why his
parents never saw fit to have him naturalized; but as I said
earlier, because of the length of time that he has remained in the
United States, he is effectively an American. And so I don't think
anyone should be surprised that he came back. We sent him to a
place as foreign to him as the moons of Saturn would be to any of
us who is lucky enough to claim American citizenship.
And so, as he says, he slept in cemeteries and lived out of
garbage barrels because he doesn't speak the language and he
doesn't have any support system or family in the Dominican
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Republic.
It shouldn't be a surprise that he came back. After all, how
many people from the Dominican Republic want to go back? The
only way they seem to go back from the United States is if they've
been deported, and so it's not surprising that this Defendant came
back.
I look at paragraph (2) of Section 3553(a), and that requires
the Court to look at the need for the sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law and to
provide a just punishment for the offense. As I have said here,
this is essentially a nonviolent offense.
This Defendant now knows that he can never come back to
the United States and that if he does, he will be sent to prison.
I must consider whether or not the sentence I impose will
afford an adequate deterrence, whether it will protect the public
from further crimes. Again I say this is a nonviolent offense.
And finally, I look at paragraph (2)(D) that talks about the
need to provide the Defendant with educational or vocational
training, medical care or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner; and I think here that the Court may take into
account the length of the incarcerative sentence to be imposed
because, after all, the length of the sentence is a function of how
those items will be addressed, in particular with someone who's
going to be deported at he conclusion of the sentence.
The kinds of sentences available. Well, the Government has
correctly pointed out to the Court that I do not have the authority
to suspend any portion of an incarcerative sentence. So I'm
limited to a sentence of probation or a term of imprisonment.
And finally, the kinds of sentences and sentencing range
established by the sentencing guidelines. Here, that range calls
for an incarcerative term of at least seven years or as much as 105
months.
Paragraph subsection (6) talks about the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among Defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, and
paragraph (7) is really not applicable here.
It talks about
restitution.
As I read Booker and as I read Section 3553, the sentencing
Court has an obligation to take all of those factors into account,
not giving any one any particular weight, but take them all into
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account in looking at the human being who sits in this courtroom
who is the subject of the sentence I'm about to impose.
In this case, taking all of the facts that I mentioned earlier
into account, I find that an incarcerative terms of four years is
sufficient to carry out the objectives of Section 3553 without being
a sentence that's greater than necessary to carry out those
objectives.
Four years is a very long time in anyone's life. For this
Defendant, it will mean that he will have period of time to adjust
to the fact that he's going to be deported, it will give him an
opportunity, hopefully, to learn Spanish well enough that he can
get along when he's sent back to the Dominican Republic, that he
can perhaps educate himself as to what job prospects he might
have in that country and hopefully as well to gain some job
training so that he can successfully integrate into the society of
the Dominican Republic. After all, what we really want to achieve
here is to keep him out of the United States.
I find that a sentence at the low end of the guideline range
here, seven years, is greater than necessary to effectuate those
goals of sentencing. And so I have decided here not to impose a
sentence within that guideline range as the Government has
argued.

